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INTRODUCTION  resource  owner  is  determining  the  loss  or  cost
resulting  from  interference  with  use  of  his  surface
Rapid  increases  in  energy  prices,  federal  policies  right.  This  determination  will  specify  the  minimum
of  energy  independence  and  further  projections  of  price  he  must  extract  to  allow  access  to  the  sub-
energy  shortages  are  encouraging  development  of  surface  resource.  For the miner who desires access  to
sources  of energy  such as  strip mining for coal. A  key  the  subsurface  right,  the  issue  is  the maximum  price
issue  faced  by  the  owner  of surface  and  sub-surface  that can  be paid for reclamation  and the right to mine
(mineral)  rights  to  land  is determination  of the  price  without  impairing  his  profit.  A  further  issue  of
or  fee  (royalty)  that  should  be  extracted  from  a  importance  is  the  impact  of  different  reclamation
miner  who  wants  access  to  the  subsurface  resource.  practices  on  the  maximum  royalty acceptable  to  the
This  is  a  crucial  problem  because  productivity  and  surface  owner.
income  potential  of  the  surface  resource  may  be  In reality,  royalty value is  composed primarily of
altered  during  the  mining  process.  Although  extract-  two parts - intrinsic value of the mineral  and value of
ing  coal  through  strip  mining  is an  obvious  example  reduced  surface  production  due  to  mining.  The
of this phenomenon,  the  same  issue  is confronted  in  following  conceptual  model  develops  a  method  to
surface  extraction  of other  minerals  or  in  placement  analyze  the  value  of reduced  surface  production,  but
of  easements  or  restrictions  on  land  use  options  does  not attempt to measure  the intrinsic value of the
available  to surface  property-right owners.  mineral.  As  a consequence,  the conceptual  model  and
The  particular  mode of accessing  the subsurface  the  resulting  example  generate  minimum  royalty
resource  will  influence  not  only  cost  to the  miner,  values  for the  land  owner that  are  typically  less than
but  also  the  future  income  stream  of  the  surface  current  market  prices.  The  difference,  of  course,
owner.  For example,  strip  mining with no attempt to  depends on  the  value  of the  particular  mineral (gold,
reclaim  the  surface  will  lower  costs  to the miner,  but  coal,  limestone,  etc.)  and  relative  economic  condi-
will  also  lower  the  future  income  stream  of  the  tions.
surface  right  holder  - thus  encouraging  the  surface
right  owner  to  extract  a  higher  price  for interfering
with  his  use  of  the  surface  resource.  In  contrast,
reclamation  will  usually  increase  the  miner's  direct  Two  firms  are  assumed:  one  owns  both  surface
cost, but reduce  income  forgone  by  the  surface  right  and  subsurface  property  rights,  and  the  other  wants
owner.  Thus,  the  owner  need  not  extract  as  high  a  to  extract  subsurface resources.  Each  firm operates in
royalty  to  compensate  for  the  interference  with his  a  competitive  market  where  prices  of  inputs  and
surface  activity.  products  are  exogeneously  determined.  The  owner
In  essence,  a  key  issue  faced  by  the  surface  may  be  a  farmer  or  rancher  who produces  and  sells
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29agricultural  commodities  as  his  source  of income  or  surface  altered  during  the  mining  process,  the
someone  who sells recreation  services, forest products  farmer's  income  is reduced  through reduced  produc-
or  other  surface  services.  In  this  example,  the  owner  tivity  during  the  mining  and  reclamation  period. The
is  assumed  to  be  a  farmer.  The  miner  extracts  and  actual  level  and  timing  of  loss  depends  upon  the
sells  the  subsurface  resource  to  generate  income.  In  mining  and  reclamation  process  used.  This  reduced
addition,  he  produces  a  second  product  that  influ-  productivity  can  be  reflected  in  lower  income  by
ences  the  future  income  stream  of the  owner - the  substituting the  production relationship for reclaimed
quality  and  productivity  of  the  land  surface  after  land  in  equation  (1).  In  general,  the  production
mining.  Both  firms  maximize  profits  independently,  function  for reclaimed land would be specified  as:
The  Farmer  yt* = f(X*, R*)  (4)
The  minimum  price  (royalty)  the  farmer  should
accept  to  allow  the  miner  to  interfere  with  his  where
cultivation  of  the  surface  is  the  income  that will  be 
yt  =  agricultural  output  on  reclaimed  land  in foregone  during  and  after  the  mining  process.  The
time  t  (may  be  zero  during  mining,  and farmer's  future  income  stream  from a particular tract  nga
different  commodities  may  be  produced of non-mined land can be defined  as:
after mining)
w  s  Xt* = agricultural  inputs to be used on reclaimed
E  Qr yt  V  t vt  i  Qji Y  - Pi  i  Xi  land in time  t and
I=  —  - (1)  R* = quality  characteristics  of  the  land  imme-
^~~~~t=1  (~  +^~  r~  ~diately  after mining.
where  Furthermore,  the  farmer  may associate  a  higher
net  present  value  of  income  during  the  isk  with  producing  agricultural  crops  on  reclaimed I=  net  present  value  of  income  during  the
land.  Thus,  the  discount  rate  included  in  (1)  for planning horizon
pt  f agricultural  comm  s in  te  farming reclaimed land would be defined  as:
QP  - price  of agricultural  commodities  in time  t
t  = price of agricultural  inputs in time  t  r= rP  + r  -- r  (5)
Y  agricultural  outputs in  time t
agricultural  inputs in  time t and
where r  rate of discount.
r  higher  risk  premium  associated  with  pro-
The  production  function  representing  agri-
cultural production on non-mined land is  specified  as:  r  expected  rate  of  annual  land  value  ap-
r" - expected  rate  of  annual  land  value  ap-
Yt =f(Xt, R)  (2)  preciation.
By substituting  relationships  (4)  and  (5),  and  (2)  and
where  (3),  respectively,  in  equation  (1),  an  income  stream
Xt  .conventional  management  and  inputs  and  for  farming  reclaimed  land  can  be  generated.  If  I X. = conventional  management  and  inputs  and
1  represents  the  future  income  stream  (using  equation
R = quality  characteristics  of  non-mined  land.
(1))  from  farming  the  tract of land with  no  mining,
The rate of discount  is defined  as:  and  I*  the  future  income  stream  from  farming  on
reclaimed  land,  the  minimum  royalty  the  farmer
r = rP + r t - rcc (3)  would accept  for the right to mine is defined  as:
where  Lmin =I-I*  (6)
rP  = a pure  time preference  for money  The Miner
rc t- risk  premium  associated  with  traditional
The  maximum  price  (royalty) a miner can pay to agricultural  production
oc  rat  ofo annual  acquire  access  to  the  subsurface  resource  is  the r  = expected  rate  of  annual  land  value  appre-
ciation.difference  between his potential income  from the sale ciation.o
of the  coal  and his total expenses  (including  a normal
If  the  subsurface  resource  is  mined  and  the  profit),  excluding the royalty payments.
3Asset  appreciation  is  assumed  to  substitute  in  part  for  annual  revenue  from  using  an asset.  Therefore,  the rate  used  to
discount annual cash  income is reduced by the rate of land  appreciation to reflect substitution of capital gain for cash income.
30Expenses incurred  during mining  and reclamation  Ft  = inputs  unique  to  the  reclamation  process
vary  with  different  techniques  and  equipment  in  time t
complements.  Draglines,  shovels  and  scraper-dozer  Dt  = inputs  unique  to  the  coal  production
complements  have  different  operating  costs  per  ton  process  in  time t.
depending  upon  whether  they  are  involved  in  the
mining  operation  or reclamation.  Draglines  generally  Scrapers,  dozers,  draglines  and  shovels  are  examples
have  low  (relative  to shovels and scraper-dozers)  costs  of Et  inputs  because  they  can  be  used  to mine  coal
per  ton  during  mining but higher  costs  per  ton when  as  well  as  to  reclaim  land.  Draglines  and  shovels  can
certain  reclamation  operations  are  performed.  Con-  judiciously  remove  and  replace  overburden  while
versely,  scraper-dozer  complements  have  high  (rela-  dozers  and  scrapers  can  level  and  relocate  spoil piles.
tive  to  draglines  and  shovels) costs per ton for mining  Unique  inputs  of  reclamation  (Ft)  include  seed,
functions  but lower costs per ton for various reclama-  fertilizers  and  traditional farming equipment.  Alterna-
tion  practices.  Therefore,  the  maximum  royalty  a  tively,  certain  inputs  such  as  front-end  loaders  and
miner  can  pay  (Lmax)  will  vary  among  mining  and  augers  used  to  mine  coal  are  generally  not  used  in
reclamation  methods and can  be expressed  as:  reclamation.
Finally, state and  federal laws specify  a minimum
Pt  Ct - _  pt  Zt  quality of the reclaimed land, or
LmI1 ax
Z  n=l
L  ,,  (7)
t=i  (1 + v)t  R*>  R.  (10)
where  Notice  that  the  quality  of  reclaimed  land  (R*=
Pt - price  of coal  in time t  mE  m 
t  . . input  in  the  farmer's  crop production  function.  R  is
C" = coal  output in time t Ct  col o  t in  te  t  one  of the  key  constraints  for the individual  decision
Pt  = price  of  coal  mining  and  reclamation  in-
pm.i  . o  ca.  . an  relmto  i-  maker,  but  it  is  a  decision  variable in  the  public
puts  in time  t excluding price  of the  right  . policy  arena.  In  fact,  one  possible  application  of this
to access  of the  subsurface resource
t oalcinn  an  .rcam  . . . conceptual  model  is  to  determine  private  costs  of Zt = coal  mining and reclamation  inputs in time
m  exluin.  . t  th  suurae  various levels  of R as an input into the policy  decision
t  excluding  right  to  the  subsurface
concerning reclamation laws.
resource
This  conceptual  model  requires  a  complete
v= rate  of  discount  (possibly  composed  of
tie  p,  r,  at  an  of  specification  of  the  cost  and  revenue  functions  for time  preference,  risk,  asset appreciation  of
inputs,  ano  . fboth  miner  and  farmer,  and  empirical  relationships
inputs, and/or  other  factors unique  to the 
industry).  for  production  functions  must  be  estimated.
industry). Response  data necessary to empirically  estimate these
The  mining  process  generates  two  outputs,  coal  relationships  are  sketchy  and  very  limited.2 An
and  reclaimed  land  with  particular  quality  charac-  alternative  approach,  based  on the  same  concepts,  is
teristics.  These outputs  are  influenced  by the  mining  to  use  budgets  rather  than  continuous  production
and  reclamation  procedures  used and  can be specified  functions  to  determine  the  difference  in  royalties  a
as:  miner can  pay  (or that a farmer would require) based
on different reclamation  practices.
ct = f(E t , Dt)  (8)
(coal production  function)  AN ILLUSTRATIVE  EXAMPLE3
R*= f(Et  Ft  )  )  A  simple  example  will  be  used  to  illustrate  the
impact  of  different  reclamation  practices on  royalty
(reclaimed  land production function)  payments  and  land  values.  Results  will  indicate  the
minium  royalty  the  farmer  should  be  willing  to where
accept,  maximum  royalty  the  miner can pay,  and the
Et = inputs  used  to  produce  coal  and  reclaim  difference  (if  one  exists)  which  represents  a  cost
land in time t  someone must bear.
2An  intensive  search  was  performed  to  find useful secondary  data to estimate  response functions. See [3]  in the references
section for further information.
3 Results contained  in this example  are synthesized  from  actual  conditions  and are based  on the most reliable  information
available  concerning  costs,  prices and  reclamation  and  management  practices.  Caution should  be used in further extrapolation  of
these results.
31Assumptions  $.1444  per  bank  cubic  yard  (BCY).  Scrapers  can
The  land  profile  is  characterized  by  40  feet  of  perform  soil  replacement  operations  for  $.30  per
both  toxic  and  non-toxic  shale-eight  feet  of glacial  BCY.  All  other  operations  and  costs  are  assumed
till  and  loess  as  soil  parent  material,  and  five  feet  of  constant among methods.
the  A  horizon  topsoil  and  B  horizon  soil.  The  Impact on the Farmer
following  four  mining  and reclamation  methods  are
considered:  The  farmer's  estimated  returns  to land  per  acre
for various rotation practices and  the two post-mining
(1)  Invert  overburden,  then  leave  toxic  material  soil  moisture  scenarios  are  shown  in Table 1. With no
on  surface  with  no  agricultural  production  moisture  holding  problem  on  a  wheat-wheat-wheat-
possible.  corn-corn  rotation  and  a  reclamation  practice  of
(2)  Invert  burden,  then  place  nontoxic  material  replacing  five  feet  of  soil,  production  and  income
on  surface  with limited  agricultural  produc-  approach  original  land potential.  A reclamation prac-
tion possible.  tice  of  replacing  two  and  one-half  feet  of soil  has
(3)  Remove  the top  two and one-half feet of soil  returns  to  land  of  only  about  80  percent  of  the
from  surface  before  mining  and  spread  on  original  land  and reclamation  practice  of five  feet  of
reclaimed  land.  Agricultural  production  is  soil.  When  no  soil  replacement  is  performed  during
increased over method  (2) above.  reclamation  but a  nontoxic  surface  is left,  returns  to
(4)  Remove  the top five feet of soil  from surface  land  are  reduced  by  40  percent.  Land  values  are
before  mining  and  spread on reclaimed land.  correspondingly  lower.
Agricultural  production  reaches  pre-mined  Under  a  wheat-wheat-wheat-corn-corn  rotation
levels  after the  fifth year of production after  . . . . . levels  after  the  fifth year of production after  with low  moisture  holding  capacity  soil after mining,
mining terminates,  production  is  reduced  dramatically  except  for  the
A  five  year  span  is  assumed  to  be the  minimum  reclamation  practice  involving  replacement  of  five
time  frame  for  the  soil  to  stabilize  after  being  feet of soil.6 Reduced  water holding  capacity  results
disturbed.4 The  land  disturbed  is  assumed  to  have  in  "normal"  production  during  wet years,  but  low
high  productivity  (100  bushels  per  acre  of corn,  40  production  during  normal  or dry  years.  Reclamation
bushels  per  acre  of  wheat).  In  addition,  two  post  with  two  and  one-half  feet  of soil  reduces returns  to
mining  moisture  characteristics  are  considered-low  land  by  65  percent  compared  to  pre-mining  condi-
moisture  holding  capacity  and  no  moisture  holding  tions,  and  reclamation  without  soil  replacement
problem.  A  major  problem  associated  with  reclama-  (leaving  a non-toxic surface) reduces returns by about
tion  is  compaction,  which  reduces  moisture  holding  88 percent.
capacity  and  restricts  root  growth.  Corn  and  wheat  With  no  soil  replacement  but a nontoxic surface,
are  the  two  crops  analyzed;  corn  because  of its  wide  negative  net  returns  are  indicated  in  all  cases  during
adaptability  as  a  row  crop  and  wheat  for its superior  the first  and  second  years  in agricultural  production.
quality  during the early  portion of reclamation.5 Two  The  farmer  is not recovering  variable  costs and would
cropping  rotations  are  considered,  a  wheat-wheat-  be  better off not to produce.  However,  it is assumed
wheat-corn-corn  rotation and  continuous wheat.  that the soil must go through tillage  cycles to improve
The  farmer  is  assumed  to  own both  surface  and  pore  space,  tilth  and  build  up  organic  matter  if  no
mineral  rights  in  fee  simple.  For  the  miner,  a  small  topsoil  is  replaced.  The  farmer  must  sustain  these
dragline  is assumed  to be used as  the primary stripper.  losses  in  order  to  attain  positive  net  returns  during
All  overburden  is  moved  with  the  dragline  in projec-  later time periods.
tions  where  soil  is  not  replaced.  Wheel  tractor  Miners  have  indicated  that  a  decrease  in  yield
scrapers  are  used  to  move  soil in operations requiring  often  occurs  during the second year of production on
replacement  of  soil  on  top  of  other  spoils.  Scraper  reclaimed  land.  Data  and  experiments  do  not  show
one-way  hauling  distance  is  1400  feet.  Owning  and  conclusively  why  these  yield  decreases  occur;  how-
operating  costs  for  the  dragline  are  estimated  at  ever,  nitrogen  immobilization  by microbes may occur
4 Actually,  soil  conditions  will  never  stabilize,  but  after  five  years  the  change  is  assumed  to be  gradual  and  for practical
purposes non-measurable.
SReclamation  practices  by  industry  as well as agronomic research by universities and private  firms provide evidence that row
crop-small grain (especially  wheat)  rotations are excellent tillage practices  for reclaimed land.
6Five  feet  of  soil  is  assumed  to  be  sufficient  to  prevent  water  holding  problems  due  to  compaction  from  mining  and
reclamation.  Topsoil texture  and  type, slope and drainage  after reclamation  are all assumed  to be similar to pre-mined  conditions.
It  may be  possible  to reclaim land to higher productivity with tiles, terraces  and other soil improvement methods,  particularly  on
certain land  types. Presently,  however,  empirical studies reveal only very isolated  cases of mined land being higher in  productivity
than unmined land.
32TABLE  1.  RETURN  ABOVE  VARIABLE  COST  PER  ACRE  FOR  LAND  WITH  HIGH  PRE-MINED
PRODUCTIVITY  BEFORE  AND  AFTER  MINING  UNDER  VARIOUS  ROTATIONS  AND
RECLAMATION  PRACTICES
Years  Proportion  of  Pre-mined
Productivity  After
Rotation  Practices  1a  2  3  4  5  6  MiningC
----  dollars  per  acre------------------------  ----- percent  -----
Non-Mined  Land
Continuous  Corn  $98.83  98.83  98.83  98.83  98.83  98.83  --
Continuous  Wheat  87.30  87.30  87.30  87.30  87.30  87.30 
Mined  Land
Wheat-Wheat-Wheat-Corn-Corn
(No  moisture  holding  problem)
No  topsoil-Toxic  Surface  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  0  (11.70)  (27.20)  12.30  14.84  55.34  60
2  1/2  feet  of  soil  0  22.80  23.30  42.30  48.34  79.59  80.5
5  feet  of  soil  0  37.30  47.80  54.80  70.59  98.84  100
Wheat-Wheat-Wheat-Corn-Corn
(Low  moisture  holding  capacity)
No  topsoil-Toxic  Surface  0  0  0  0  0  0  d 
No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  0  (11.70)  (27.20)  12.30  (52.66)  (17.16)  12.3
2  1/2  feet  of  soil  0  22.80  23.30  42.30  3.34  34.59  35
5  feet  of  soil  0  37.30  47.80  54.80  70.59  98.84  100
Continuous  Wheat
(No  moisture  holding  problem)
No  topsoil-Toxic  Surface  0  0  0  0  0  0
No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  0  (11.70)  (27.20)  12.30  31.05  49.80  57
2  1/2  feet  of  soil  0  22.80  23.30  42.30  64.80  72.30  82.8
5  feet  of  soil  0  37.30  47.80  54.80  71.05  87.30  100
aLand is assumed not to be in production  for one year during the mining process.
bAfter the fifth year back in  production, land is assumed  to maintain the fifth year's return into infinity.
CThese  percentages  were  derived through  the budgeting  process which includes  the best production  response  data available
from  university  personnel  (Iowa  State  University,  Western  Illinois  University  and  the  University  of  Florida),  industry  (Utah
International,  Amax  Coal  Co.  and  Peabody  Coal  Co.),  and  other  individuals  involved  in both  private  and  public  reclamation
projects.
dLosses  occur because rotation shifts  from wheat to corn during remaining years.
while  the  previous  crop  residue  is  decomposing,
decreasing  nitrogen  availability  for second  year crop  TABLE  2.  NET  PRESENT  VALUE  OF  INFINITE
production.  This  occurrence  presumably  could  be  INCOME  STREAMS  (LAND  VALUES)
eliminated with proper management.  FROM  NON-MINED  LAND  AND  LAND
Table  2  summarizes  land  values  for  the  various  RECLAIMED  UNDER  VARIOUS
reclamation  scenarios  of Table  1.  These values  were  RECLAMATION  PLANS,  CROP  ROTA-
calculated  as  the discounted  net revenue  stream from  TIONS  AND  DISCOUNT  RATES
farming  (net  returns  to  land)  for  the  different  Discount  Rate  (X)
mining-reclamation-rotation  practices.  Maintaining  Reclamation  Pan  6  8  1  14
Rotation  Practice  6  8  10  12  14
land  in production  and not mining  has a higher value  ----------------- dollars per  acre-----------
to  the  owner  for  any  given  discount  rate  than  any  Non-Mined  orn  1,631  1,223  978  81  699
Continuous  CornWheat  1,63455  1,22091  873 72815  69924
mining-reclamation-rotation  practice.  This  is because  Continuous  Wheat  1,455  1,091  873  728  624
Mined
no  agricultural  production  occurs  during the year of  Wheat-Wheat-Wheat-Corn-Corn
(No moisture  holding  problem)
mining  and  lower  returns  are  obtained  during  the  o  oisture  holding  problem)
No  topsoil-Toxic  Surface  0  0  0  0  0
rehabilitation  period.  No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  677  458  331  249  193
2  1/2  feet  of soil  1,098  777  588  464  378
The  difference  between  net  present  value  with-  5 feetof  soil  1394  995  759  604  495
out  mining  and  net present value  with  mining  under  Wheat-Wheat-Wheat-Corn-Corn (Low moisture  holding  capacity)
any  rotation-reclamation  practice  represents  eco-  No  topsoil-Toxic  Surface  0  0  0  0  0
nomic loss to the farmer.  He must recover at least this  No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  ()  (16)  (28  227  188
value  in  royalties to allow  mining to take place. Using  5  feet  of soil  1,394  995  759  604  495
Continuous  Wheat
the  conceptual  model  outlined  earlier  and  an  eight  (No  moisture  holding  problem)
percent  discount rate,  unmined  continuous corn land  No  topsoil-Toxic  Surface  0  0  0  0  0
No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  620  422  307  232  181
has  a  value  of  $1223  per  acre  (I).  Land  reclaimed  21/2  feet  of  soil  1,022  728  557  440  360
5 feet  of  soil  1,257  901  690  552  454
with  two  and  a  half  feet  of  soil  with  no  moisture
33holding  problem  is worth  $777  per acre  (I*).  There-  TABLE  4.  MINIMUM  ROYALTY  ACCEPTABLE
fore,  minimum  royalty  acceptable  to  the  farmer  (Lmin)  BY  THE  FARMER  UNDER
(Lmin)  is  $446,  i.e.,  Lmin  = $1223  - 777 - $446.  VARIOUS  RECLAMATION  PLANS
The  farmer  must  have  $446  per  acre  to  cover  the  AND  DISCOUNT  RATES  (ASSUMING  A
value  of lost  production  while  mining  and  of lower  FOUR  PERCENT  RISK PREMIUM  FOR
production  during and after rehabilitation.  FARMING  RECLAIMED  LAND)  WITH
Growing  crops  on  reclaimed  land  is  generally  CONTINUOUS  CORN  AS THE  INITIAL
riskier  than  unmined  land.  If  the  farmer  assigns  an  PRE-MINED  CROP
additional  risk  premium  of  four  percent  to  farming
on  reclaimed  land  (an  increase  from  eight  to  12  Discount  Rates
Pre-mining-6%;  Pre-mining-8%  Pre-mining-  10%
percent  in  the  above  example)  reclaimed  land  value  Reclamation  Prac.ice  After  reclamation-10% AferReclamaeon-12% After  reclamaion-14
(I*)  decreases  from  $777  to  $464.  Lmi n then  ----------------dollars  per acre-------------
Wheat-Wheat-Wheat-Corn-Corn
(No moisture  holding  problem) increases  from $446  to  $759  ($1223 - 464). Table  3  1631  1223  978
No topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  1300  974  785 shows  various  Lmin  values  under  different  reclama-  1/2 feet  of soil  1043  759  00 Jl^^^l  5 feet  of soil  872  619  483
tion practices  and  discount rates (to show sensitivity)  Wheat-wheat-Wheat-corn-Cor
(Low  moisture  holding  capacity) with  no  additional  risk  premium  for  farming  mined  1  toi-oic  Surface  631  1223  978
No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  1761  1331  1071
compared  to  unmined  land.  Table 4  shows  Lmin  fea1/
2
e t  of  soil  82  .
values  when  mined  land  has  a  four  percent  risk
premium compared  to unmined  land.
Data  in  Table  2  assume  loss  of  one  cropping  value  when  a  14  percent  discount  rate  is  used.  The
season  with  crop  production  beginning  in  the second  farmer's required royalty payments would increase by
crop  season  after  mining.  If land is out of production  similar amounts.
for  more  than  one  season,  values  of  reclaimed  land
would  be  less  and  royalty  payments  necessarily  Impact on the Miner
higher.  For  example,  leaving  land  out of production  As  mined  land  is  reclaimed  to  higher  levels  of
two  years  instead  of  one  results  in approximately  a  productivity,  post-mining  value  increases  and,  there-
five  percent  decrease  in land value when a six percent  fore,  the  amount  of royalties  required  by  the  farmer
discount  rate  is  used  and  a  12  percent  decrease  in  decreases.  Reclaiming  land  to  higher  productivity
levels,  however,  results  in  increased  costs  to  the
TABLE  3.  MINIMUM  ROYALTY  ACCEPTABLE  miner.  By  analyzing  incremental  changes  in  cost  to
(Lmin)  BY  THE  FARMER  UNDER  reclaim  land, to higher productivity  levels, changes  in
(VARIOUS  BY  TEC  FARMEO  ULNDE  the  miner's  ability  to  pay  royalties  can  be  deter- VARIOUS  RECLAMATION  PLANS,
CROP  ROTATIONS  AND  DISCOUNT  mined.  In  the  following  discussion  only  the  incre-
RATES  (NO  RISK  PREMIUM  FOR  mental  cost  changes  and  incremental  ability  to  pay
will  be  evaluated,  not  the  total  amount of royalties FARMING  RECLAIMED  LAND)  WITH
CONTINUOUS  CORN  AS INITIAL PRE-  m  c 
MINED  CEROP  Table  5  shows additional cost incurred to replace
soil  with  scrapers  and  dragline cost  savings  with  soil
Discount  Rate  (X)  replacement.  It  is  assumed  that  no  additional  costs
Reclamation  and
Rotation  Practicet  6  8  10  12  14  are  incurred  by  the  miner  to invert  the  overburden
…—---—„  -dollars per acre———…——  ^and  leave  nontoxic  soil  on  the  surface.7 The  soil
Wheat-Wheat-Wheat-Corn-Corn
(No moisture  holding  problem)  replacement  operation,  therefore,  is of primary  con-
No topsoil-Toxic  Surface  1631  1223  978  81s  699  cern  in  determining  increased  costs  of  reclamation No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  954  756  647  566  506
e  ^2  1/2  feet  of  soil  533  446  390  351  32  1  and the miner's ability to pay royalties. 5 feet  of  soil  237  228  219  211  204
JWheat-Wheat-Wheat-Corn-Corn  If the miner places  two  and one half  feet of soil
(Low moisture  holding  capacity)
on  the  surface,  net  increase  in  cost  to  the  miner  is
No topsoil-Toxic  Surface  1631  1223  978  815  699
No topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  1845  1385  1108  923  792  $628  per acre  (Table  5).  If we  assume royalties  paid
2  1/2  feet  of  soIl  1124  857  696  588  511
5  feet  of  soil  237  228  219  211  204  in  one  lump  sum  and,  therefore,  do  not  require
Cont  urdin  g problem)  discounting  and  a  normal  profit  margin,  maximum
(No moisture  holdIng  problem)
No  topsoil-Toxic  Surface  1631  1223  978  815  699  royalty  (Lmax)  is  then decreased  by  $628  compared
No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  1011  801  671  583  518
2  1/2  feet  of  soil  609  495  421  375  339  to  theroyalty  with  no  soil  replacement.  Ability  of
5 feet  of  soil  374  322  288  263  245
the  miner  to  pay  royalties  decreases  as  soil  replace-
7This  is not  an unrealistic  assumption in  most areas of the United States.  By judiciously placing overburden with a dragline,
a nontoxic surface can be obtained without much difficulty by using horizon  C loess.
34TABLE 5.  CHANGE  IN  MINING  COSTS  DUE  TO  (increased  private  cost  of  reclamation  minus  the
VARIOUS  RECLAMATION  PRACTICES  private  income  benefit)  for  different  reclamation
practices.
Added  cost
Dragline  to  spread  Net  increase
cost  saved  topsoil  by  in  cost  to
Reclamation-Rotation  Practices  by  miner  miner  miner  (L  )
ma_  x  CONCLUSIONS
------------------ dollars  per  acre--------  The  analysis  illustrates  that  good  agricultural
Wheat-Wheat-Wheat-Corn-Corn
(No  moisture  holding  problem)  land,  even  when  reclaimed  to  a  high  productivity
No  topsoil-Toxic  Surface  0  0  0  level,  does  not  have  a  discounted  income  stream
No topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  0  0  0
2  1/2  feet  of  soil  582  1,210  628
52  feet of  soil  1,164  2,20  ,25a  approaching  the  value  of  non-mined  land.  Further,
as  productivity  is  increased  to  a  higher  level
a$1,256  per acre  is a conservative  figure when compared  through  better  reclamation  increased  costs  of  re-
to  recent  estimates based  on reclaiming  land  to  its original 
condition.  Estimates  in  this  table  are,  however,  logically  clamation  more  than  offset  the  incremental  revenue
consistent  and  reliable  when  intermediate  stages of reclama-  from  farming  the  land.  Reclamation  past  the  no
tion (nontoxic,  toxic,  21/2  feet,  5 feet, etc.)  are performed.
topsoil-nontoxic  stage,  therefore,  is  economically
inefficient  if  only  private  costs  and  benefits  are
ment  operations  increase  his  costs.  With  five  feet  of  considered.
9
soil  replaced  by  the  miner,  maximum  royalties  An additional issue  faced with higher reclamation
decrease  by $1,256  per acre.  levels  is  who  will  absorb  the  net difference  between
When  soil  replacement  operations are  performed,  the  change  in  minimum  royalty  the  farmer  is  willing
royalty  required  by  the  farmer  (Lmin)  decreases  as  to  accept  and  change  in  the maximum  the miner can
indicated  earlier.  The  Lmin  for  the  farmer  with  no  pay  (difference  between  changes  in Lmin and Lma).
topsoil,  nontoxic  land  is  $974  per  acre  (Table  4).  In  the  absence  of reclamation  laws,  the  miner would
With  two  and  one-half  feet  of soil,  Lmin  is $759  per  probably  reclaim  to  a  nontoxic  surface and  pay  the
acre,  so  a  net reduction  in  required  royalties of $215  farmer  his  minimum  acceptable  royalty  for  this
per  acre  ($974-759)  occurs  with  the  addition  of two  reclamation  practice.  Most  state  reclamation  laws,
and  one-half  feet  of  soil.  The  miner's ability  to pay  however,  require  at  least  partial  soil  replacement.
(Lmax)  is  reduced  by  $628  per  acre  if  he  changes  With  two  and  one-half  feet  of  soil  replaced,  the
from  no  soil  replacement  to two  and one-half feet of  difference  between  minimum  royalty  acceptable  to
soil.  The  net  difference  of  $413  ($628-$215)  repre-  the  farmer  and  increased cost  to  the  miner  is  a  net
sents  additional  cost  the  miner  or  consumer  must  cost  of  $413  per  acre  for  the  no  moisture  holding
bear.8 Table  6  shows  various  values  for  "net  cost"  problem  scenario.
This  cost must be  absorbed  in part  (in  the  short
run)  by  the  farmer  or  miner  (resulting  in  a  loss  or
TABLE  6.  NET  DIFFERENCE  BETWEEN  THE  at  least  lower  profit  margins)  or  by  consumers
CHANGE  IN MINIMUM ROYALTY  THE  through  higher  prices  for  energy.  The  long-run
FARMER  IS  WILLING  TO  ACCEPT  result  is  that  consumers  will  pay  for  reclamation.
(Lmin)  AND  THE  CHANGE  IN  MAXI-  Furthermore,  since  net  cost  of  reclamation  (in-
MUM  ROYALTY  THE MINER  CAN PAY  creased  costs  of  reclamation  minus  increased  agri-
(Lmax)a  cultural  productivity  from  reclamation)  increases
with  the  reclamation  effort,  consumers  will  have  to
Discount  Rate  (X)  pay  a  higher  subsidy  for  higher  levels  of  reclama-
Wheat-Wheat-Wheat-Corn-Corn
(No moisutre  holding  problem)  6  8  10  12  14  tion.  Although  the  numerical  results  are  only  illus-
No  topsoil-Nontoxic  Surface  to:  ------------  dollars  per  acre----------
trative,  they  do provide further insight into economic
2 1/2  feet  of  soil  207  318  371  413  443 
5  feet  of  soil  960  1038  1085  1116  1139  costs  that  must  be  quantified  and  absorbed  in  the
public  policy  decision  as  to  the  acceptable  level  of
aFormula used: ALma - ALmi n = Net Difference.  reclamation. max  min  reclamation.
8This  represents the no  moisture  holding problem  scenario  and  any  other scenario  would  have  correspondingly  higher net
differences.
9The authors  are cognizant  of the  argument  that the social  discount  rate is lower  than the private  rate;  consequently,  if a
lower rate were used, the net difference  (Lmax - Lmin) would be reduced. This analysis,  however,  assumes a conceptual model of
private  individuals acting  independently.  To  argue  that private individuals lower their discount rate to social levels is inconsistent
with the  profit maximization  assumption.  It  may  be that  a lower  social rate should  be used  to reconcile  the net difference, but
this is part of the policy question, not of negotiations between private individuals.
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